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`WHITE BOLSHEVIKS'? THE CATHOLIC
LEFT AND THE SOCIALISTS IN ITALY±
1919±1920*
JOHN M.FOOT
Department of Italian, University College London
abstract.During Italy's `two red years'( ±), left-wing catholics challenged the authority
of the church and the landowners in large areas of northern Italy. Calling themselves the estremisti
(theextremists),leftcatholicunionsorganizedpeasantsandworkersinlandandfarmoccupationsand
encouragedaseriesofradicalstrikes.Leftcatholicleadersbecamenational®gures,inparticularGuido
Miglioli at Cremona and Romano Cocchi at Bergamo. This article examines these innovative
struggles and their troubled relationship with the traditional socialist Italian left during this turbulent
period. No alliances were formed between the estremisti and the `red' unions until ±, when
fascism was already rampant and the revolutionary wave had already subsided. The article analyses
why alliances were not built earlier, and why the socialists were so hostile towards the catholic left.
Both the theory and the practice of the traditional left prevented any positive appraisal of the
estremisti. In addition, there are detailed accounts of the extraordinary mass movements inspired by
Cocchi and Miglioli in some of the richest and most staunchly catholic regions of northern Italy.
The mixture between `Sanfedismo' and bolshevism, between the extreme
past and the extreme future (Claudio Treves's description of the PPI)."
Not even the Italian Popular Party can be the party of all classes
(G. Speranzini).#
The growth of a `white' `left' during the revolutionary years of 1919±21
marked a crucial development in the Italian catholic world. Within the newly-
formed Italian Popular Party (Partito Popolare Italiano ± PPI) the left took local
control or were a signi®cant minority in all the key areas of catholic
organization in the North, namely the Veneto, Bergamo, Cremona and
Brescia. In these regions, where the PPI won most of its votes,$ there were huge
increases in the memberships of catholic associations and the corresponding
`left' presence within these leagues, mutual-aid societies, cooperatives and
rural banks. In these `white areas', catholic sub-culture was dominant and the
left found great diﬃculty in establishing a foothold, especially in the
* I would like to thank Dr Paul Ginsborg for his help with this article.
" `Il discorso di Treves', Avanti!, 31 Mar. 1920.
# `I secessionisti del PP', L'Italia, 1 July 1919. Both L'Italia and L'Eco di Bergamo (see below)
were newspapers which represented the centre-right of the Partito Popolare.
$ Veneto 35±8 per cent, Lombardy 30±2 per cent; G. Vecchio, I cattolici milanesi e la politica.
L'esperienza del Partito Popolare (Milan, 1982), p. 85.
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countryside.Centuriesofassiduousworkbylocalpriests,catholicorganizations
andchurch-backednewspapersandculturalbodieshadconstructeda`catholic
world'ofgreatstrengthandpower.Itwasherethatthecatholicleftchallenged
the traditional conservatism and `inter-classism' of the church.
Calling themselves the estremisti (extremists), these groups occasionally
supported `workers' unity' at the base with `red' trade unions. Often their
tactics and methods resembled those of the socialists (PSI) or the `red' trade
union federation (Cgdl). Indeed, in some areas catholic organizations were
more militant than those of the `reds' and entered into violent con¯ict with the
landowners or textile bosses. Within the PPI the rise of the left signalled a crisis
foroneofthemajorbulwarksofcatholiccultureandthenewparty'sideology ±
interclassism.
This article will examine in detail two major centres of estremisti activity in
1919±21 ± Bergamo and Cremona ± whilst making reference to the Veronese,
often the nucleus of left±catholic activity in the dopoguerra. Guido Miglioli, the
`white bolshevik' was the leader of the catholic leagues in the Cremonese and
the inspiration behind the catholic left.% His tireless organization of the salariati
®ssi (or obbligati) in the dairies around Cremona, and his speeches at the ®rst
two PPI congresses (June 1919, Bologna, April 1920, Naples) provided the
practical and theoretical foundation for the movement's growth. Militants
`trained' with Miglioli at Cremona were key leaders elsewhere; Romano
Cocchi at Bergamo, Giuseppe Speranzini in the Veronese. The strikes in the
Cremonese were some of the most bitter and violent of the whole period, and
their victories in 1920±1 can be counted amongst the most important and
originalofthebienniorosso.AtBergamothechallengetothecatholicrulingclass
posed by the growth and combativity of militant `white' leagues split the
christian world wide open. At Brescia left-catholics had a strong presence, and
massive land strikes in the Veronese involved up to 150,000 `white' workers.&
However, my task here is not to describe these events in detail or in isolation.
My focus is on alliances, with the `reds' and between social groups and classes.
Thus, the problem of peasant unity remains at the centre of the analysis.
Catholics, whether led by left or right, mainly organized middle peasants, or
those rural workers with strong links to their place of work, the land. Salariati
®ssi (or obbligati), with their ®xed yearly contracts and housing, were a classic
example of this category. Obbligati were super®cially a modern class, similar to
the industrial proletariat. But strong traditional, and even feudal aspects of
their lives remained, as did their isolation in scattered courtyard farms.
Obbligati had the potential for modern class consciousness, but they were also
deeply bound to the land. Federterra (the `red' landworkers' union) mem-
% On Miglioli see Leghe bianche e leghe rosse: l'esperienza unitaria di Guido Miglioli. Atti del Convegno
teunto a Cremona (Rome, 1972); A. Zanibelli, Miglioli±Grieco: dibattito sul contadino della val Padana
(Rome, 1975); Annali della Biblioteca Statale e Libreria Civica di Cremona (Cremona, 1985); and
C. Bello, Le avanguardie contadine cristiane nella valle del Po: da documenti inediti (Rome, 1979).
& Forthese events and an analysis of them see above all the article by G. Zalin, `Lotte contadine
e leghe bianche nel Veronese: prime ricerche' in S. Zaninelli, ed., Il sindacalismo bianco tra guerra,
dopoguerra e fascismo (±) (Milan, 1982), pp. 599±628.the catholic left in italy 417
bership, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly based upon the more shifting
agricultural classes ± the day-labourers (braccianti and avventizi). As Miglioli
put it in March 1920, `we tend to develop a strong sentiment of attachment to
the land, the socialists tend to defend the waged-worker and the day-labourers
for revolutionary ends and in homage to the principle of communism' (Il
Popolo, 13 March 1920).'
Any rural alliances had to overcome not only the historical `subjective'
political diﬀerences between socialists and catholics. There were also `ob-
jective' ®ssures between the types of workers and peasants organized ±
diﬀerences which often remained hidden by the very fact of catholic and socialist
organization. Even a complete absence of anticlericalism and anti-socialism
would have left the problem of alliances still to be solved. It was not by chance
that the catholic left, whilst remaining far less anti-socialist than the rest of the
PPI, never expressed doubts about the desirability of the `end' of small
property. As Miglioli bluntly put it at Naples `we defend private property'.(
The importance of this point was increased by the failure of the estremisti to
make signi®cant inroads amongst the urban working class. At Milan, for
example, the estremisti were conspicuous only by their absence amongst the
numerous catholic unions in the city.) Catholics at Bergamo did organize
textile workers, but this was an industry linked organically to the rural world
and which mainly employed peasant workers.
I
The`politicaltheories'heldbythecatholicleftinthisperiodarediﬃculttopin
down. A general lack of sources and the very vagueness of the ideas of these
agitators make the reconstruction of any uni®ed theory an arti®cial task.
`Demagogic' was a term of abuse used frequently against the estremisti, but it
does capture some of the texture of their style and mode of organizing. Most
estremisti leaders were above all activists, and as a result `theory' often changed
withtheswingsofvictoryanddefeat.Itisfromtheseshiftingfragmentsthatthe
mainthemes of the catholicleft's ideology must be reconstructed. In relation to
the socialists the most important of these themes was the idea of `proletarian
unity'. Its most coherent advocate was Giuseppe Speranzini.
Speranzini was a militant peasant-organizer in the Veronese, a paci®st and
editoroftheestremistinewspaperConquistaPopolare.During1919±20hereturned
time and again to the ideaofworkers'unity ± arguing fortrade-unionalliances
outside of the political parties, a sort of catholic revolutionary syndicalism.
Proletarian links were to be formed from below.* Speranzini believed that
alliances of this type would `naturally' develop as catholic unions shifted
' Now in C. Bello, ed., L'Azione: antologia di scritti, ± (Rome, 1967), p. 459.
( Cited in Partito Socialista Italiano, I popolari e la proprieta [ (Milan, 1920), p. 11.
) O. Motta, `Sindacalismo cristiano a Milano nel ``Biennio Rosso''', Bollettino dell'Archivio per la
storia del movimento sociale Cattolico in Italia [hereafter Bollettino], xxvii (1992), 325 and passim.
* Vecchio, I cattolici,p . 149. On Speranzini (1889±1976) see G. Acocella, `Sindacalismo
cattolico e partito cristiano in uno scritto di Giuseppe Speranzini', in Zaninelli, ed., Il sindacalismo,
pp. 11±36.418 john m.foot
leftwards under political and economic pressure, and therefore closer to the
socialist organizations. Unions were also the basis of future society, a `workers'
state'. Trade unions in themselves were not anti-christian, and therefore
alliances between them were possible. Thus, Speranzini argued for economic
and not political unity, a theory ¯exible enough to allow anti-socialism to co-
exist with a commitment to alliances with the `red' unions.
Yet there were many problems with these tactics, and the ®rst lies in their
simplicity. Speranzini's plan glossed over the diverse origins and bases ±
material, cultural and ideological ± of the catholic and socialist workers'
movements,andthisledtoanover-estimationofalliancepossibilities.Members
of `red' and `white' unions did not (and could not) `naturally' ally. A common
basis for links would have to be built and continually reinforced. Speranzini's
project seemed to overlook the very essence of the catholic union movement ±
and the classes in the countryside that it appealed to; hence the accusation of
`utopia' that has been applied to his ideas. Inter-union relations, even in areas
dominatedbythe estremisti,remained fundamentally antagonistic in the period
of class struggle that followed the First World War. Simple ideas of `workers'
unity' did apply to certain `moments' of alliance, but the general picture was
one of disunity, even in estremisti regions. Speranzini's theories only fused with
reality in the defensive situation of 1922±4, when both `white' and `red'
federations were under fascist attack.
It was therefore unsurprising that Speranzini's project made little impact on
any of the three big union federations. For the `reds', `worker unity' implied
merely that all workers should join the CGL or USI. `Red' federations
maintained a strong anticlerical line in the face of the left-led `white' unions.
These attitudes did not prevent sporadic episodes of catholic±socialist unity at
a local level, for example, at Cremona and Bergamo. But these episodes
remained isolated and unrepresentative of the national trend towards violent
inter-union con¯ict.
Other contradictions plagued the catholic left. The estremisti gave priority to
proletarian unity, yet remained within an interclass party. Catholic-left
activists made interclassism a focal point of their attacks on the PPI leadership.
Thiscritiqueformedthebasisforasecondleft±catholicallianceproject ± based
thistimeinthepoliticalsphere.ItsaimwastotransformthePPIintoaworkers'
party,whichwouldpromoteradicalreformsand expropriatelandto distribute
to the peasants. Miglioli's speech at the ®rst PPI congress was the inspiration
fortheseideasandforthelaterformationofaseparatepartybythecatholicleft
in late 1920."! Most of the project remained unclear, but some aspects were
explicit.AtBolognaMigliolicalledforthePPItore¯ectwhathesawasitsbase,
to be a `party of the christian proletariat'."" He made a direct attack on
traditionalcatholiccultureandontheinterclassvisionsre¯ectedintheoriginal
statutes of the party. According to the Cremonese leader, `collaboration with
fractions of the bourgeoisie' was `impossible'."#
"! F. Malgeri, ed., Gli atti dei Congressi del PPI (Brescia, 1969), pp. 92±7. "" Ibid. p. 93.
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Miglioli made two important assumptions in his Bologna speech: ®rst, that
the socialists would win the next election and take power. Given this presumed
victory Miglioli advocated `popular' alliances at a national level to promote
reforms,and `land to the peasants'."$ Secondly, the deradicalization of the PSI
inparliamentwouldleavethegroundfreeforthecatholicstoworkamongstthe
proletariat on a radical and active platform. The estremisti could out¯ank the
PSI. Hence the evocative cry `the extreme left is ours!'"% Yet, again, as with
Speranzini's tactical plans, Miglioli's project was seriously ¯awed. In Novem-
ber 1919 the socialists did not win a majority, and the PPI's reform proposals
were the object of serious clashes between the PSI and `white' deputies, not of
unity. The socialists were not `integrated' to any great extent, and the PPI
right was strengthened by the election. Only Miglioli's last prediction was
correct. The economistic outlook of the CGL and its reluctance to sanction
transformativestrikeactionin thecountrysidedidleaveaspaceforthe catholic
left leagues and unions. In parts of Lombardy, the Veneto and Tuscany the
strugglesbytheleftPPIorganizationsin1919±20ledtofarmoreviolentclashes
with the employers than those involving the `reds'. Whilst the Federterra
concentrated on economic control ± over jobs and wages ± the catholics called
for `land' and `self-management'. Their policies implied the virtual abolition
of the landowners as did the famous slogan of the Cremonese movement, `the
peasant [to be] no longer a worker, the landowner no longer the master'."&
The alliance theories outlined by the two leading ®gures of the catholic left
in1919±20had littlechanceofsuccess.They underestimatedthe realitiesofthe
situation in the country and the diﬀerences, `objective' and `subjective', that
divided socialist and catholic forces. In addition the catholic left did not hide
its anti-socialism, even if this diﬀered from the more prejudicial attitudes of the
right and centre of the PPI. Whilst the estremisti argued against the
prioritization of anti-socialism within the party, they remained within the PPI,
despite its interclass character, until they were forcibly expelled. Of course,
estremisti were in an extremely diﬃcult position in attacking the church's
authority, risking complete personal isolation and even ex-communication,
Murri's (an important left catholic active at the turn of the century) fate in
1909. At a strategic level the networks of catholic and church institutions were
crucial to the survival and strength of the `white' leagues, and so the estremisti
were forced to play a double game both within and against the PPI. These
problemsandcontradictionsmilitatedagainstanypracticallinkswithsocialists
and the CGL at a local level. The PPI leadership could not aﬀord to lose the
mass base which Miglioli and his followers had built up, but when the chance
came to retake control of the party and the unions in 1920, Don Sturzo (the
party leader) clamped down on the left and expelled both Speranzini and
Cocchi. This latter event was another indication of the increasing hegemony of
anti-socialism in the catholic party.
"$ `We have to¼present more courageous reforms, that otherwise will be exploited by the
socialists and so we will have built a bridge towards the more intelligent elements of the socialist
party', Speranzini at Naples quoted in ibid. p. 189. "% Ibid. p. 92.
"& Cited in Bello, ed., L'Azione,p .119.420 john m.foot
In fact, the contribution of the catholic left to the problem of socialist±
catholic alliances is best analysed in terms of their practice, not their theory.
MiglioliandSperanziniwereactivistsaboveallelse.Thetwokeyzonesforsuch
an analysis were the strongholds of the estremisti in 1919±20, Bergamo and
Cremona.
II
The `Cremonese' was an agricultural region of key economic importance in
Lombardy ± particularly noted for milk production."' Its political aﬃliations
were split between socialist and catholic."( The `reds' organized the artisans
and workers in Cremona itself and the peasantry on the basso plains. The
catholics had more success around the Soresina and Castelleone ± particularly
amongst the salariati ®ssi in the huge dairy courtyard-farms (cascine) where
modern capitalist production methods had been introduced alongside the old
paternalistic traditions.
Cremona was one of the most paci®st areas in Italy throughout the First
WorldWar.Miglioli'sunionsandthesocialistscarriedoutamilitantcampaign
for peace in the region, and paci®sm emerged as a natural basis for a series of
short-term local alliances in early 1919.") The agitation for an eight-hour day
saw a `common struggle'."* During the carovita riots catholics and socialists
came together in mass action,#! and Cremonese `white' leagues supported the
general strike of 20±21 July, against the wishes of the national CIL.#" In this
short period, despite proclaimed mutual hostility, the masses of the two
movements did ally and certainly there were not the violent incidents that had
already broken out in other parts of Lombardy and Milan in early 1919.
Twoseparateeventsreversedthisapparentsofteningofrelationstowardsthe
middle and end of 1919. On the one hand the `white' leagues began a bitter
series of strikes. With few exceptions the `red' unions remained `neutral'
throughout these disputes, or at least this was the oﬃcial Federterra position. In
practice the ability of the employers to rely on the work of the `red' union
membership allowed them to isolate the `white' areas and amounted to a
hostile decision by the local Federterra. The roots of this decision on `neutrality'
"' The 1921 census found that 60±2 per cent of the active population were involved in
agriculture, 32±2 per cent in industry and 7±6 per cent in the tertiary sector. Of the ®rst group 70
per cent were peasants (day-labourers or ®xed-wage contract peasants) 13 per cent small rentiers
and 11 per cent small proprietors. Figuresfrom V. Duchi, `Socialistie migliolini nel Cremonese fra
ostilita ' e collaborazione (1918±1922)',Ricerche, i (1983), 77.
"( Onthe originsonthesemovementsseeL. B. Liberati inE. Ongaro, ed.,Cameradellavoro elotte
nelle campagne cremonesi (Milan, 1985), pp. 81±6, and S. Fusi, `Il Partito Popolare in Lombardia
dalle origini alla marcia su Roma', Storia in Lombardia, iii (1984), 85±8 and 106.
") According to the prefect of Milan `the agricultural masses of the Cremonese remained
irreducibly against the war', Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACDS), Pubblica Siccurezza (P.S.) 1920,
busta (b.) 83 Prefect-Min. Gab., teleg., esp., 812, 29 June 1919. See also M. Mazzucchetti,
`L'estremismo bianco nel primo dopoguerra', in A. Bendotti, ed., Il movimento operaio e contadino
bergamasco dall'Unita [ al secondo dopoguerra (Bergamo, 1981), p. 94. The mayor of Cremona, elected
in 1920, was a deserter and a socialist. "* Duchi, `Socialisti e migliolini', p. 80.
#! Ibid. p. 79. #" Miglioli, L'Azione, 19 July 1919.the catholic left in italy 421
lay in the diﬀerent ends and social bases of the two federations. The obbligati in
the`white'federationwere®ghtingto`benolongerworkers'.Catholicsalariati
®ssi demanded control of the cascine and virtual self-management of the land
and the machines they used. Their profound links to the land contrasted with
the braccianti on the plain. Landless day-labourer aspirations tied in far more
with the `socialization of the land' policy in the irrigated zones controlled by
the Federterra. In addition to these social diﬀerences, both created by and
creators of socialist ideology, were the traditional hostilities between socialist
and catholic. True, these contrasts appeared to have been less intense in areas
dominated by `left' catholic unions, but in fact the socialists reserved some of
their ®ercest criticism for the Migliolini of Cremona. Local landowners used the
unionsplit to their advantage and encouraged it through separate negotiations
and agreements.
During the 1919 strikes Miglioli's unions were described by the socialists as
`a grotesque deformation of workers' trade unionism' as a phenomenon
`purely Cremonese'## and as part of a PPI `trick'.#$ The action of the catholics
was branded as `idiotic'.#% One of the major points of attack was Miglioli's
policy on private property. The Cremonese leader was accused of wanting to
create `many sel®sh small proprietors' and as favouring what Avanti! called
`the most anti-proletarian proposal imaginable'#& ± land to the peasants. All
this was in the face of a violent and acrimonious dispute involving the catholic
peasants.TroopsoccupiedpartsofSoresinaandviolentclashestookplace.The
agreement won by the catholic leagues sanctioned for the ®rst time the
cherished principle of self-management, albeit in a limited form. Only
occasionally did the socialists admit the radicalism of the `white' leagues in the
Cremonese. Ernesto Caporali, on the whole a critic, described the base of
Miglioli's movement as `young people that from socialism accept not only the
means of ®ght and the programme, but also the maximalist end',#' which was
a classic example of socialist wishful thinking in relation to the estremisti.
Increased tension between catholics and socialists was focused around the
Novembergeneral election. During the campaign socialists broke up a number
of catholic meetings. The atmosphere of alliance of a few months earlier had
disappeared and the catholics issued a clear threat, `we want to be respected,
if, however, the socialists or anyone else intend to adopt violent methods, we
willalsoadoptthem,whilstdeploringviolence.Inthevillageswherewearethe
majority, no socialist will speak'.#( 1919 had seen a number of moments of
alliance between the left catholics and the `red' unions at Cremona, and the
beginnings of mutual tension. The social con¯icts of 1920 were to take this
tension towards the point of violence.
## `Nestore', `Divagazioni Cremonesi', Avanti!, 30 May 1919.
#$ `Il caso Miglioli', Avanti!, 23 June 1919. #% Ibid.
#& `Il nuovo patto colonico nel Cremonese', Avanti!, 14 Aug. 1919. See also La Difesa, 15 Nov.
1919 where Miglioli was described as a `liar' and a `scab'.
#' `Lo sciopero Migliolino nel Soresinese; incidenti e con¯itti', Avanti!, 16 June 1920.
#( L'Azione, 19 Oct. 1919.422 john m.foot
In June 1920 a hundred-day `white' strike in Cremona sent shock waves
across the whole country.#) According to the local prefect, the cascine were `no
longer administrated and directed by the landowners but by councils of
peasants that ``come and go'' without taking account of the employers'.#*
These obbligati were using the same methods as the workers of Turin in their
battle for the control of the factories, but it was only after the defeat of the
Cremonese movement that Gramsci and his colleagues took any interest in the
`dairy councils' of 1920±1. `White' leagues claimed `the direct and collective
management of the land'.$! Each dairy had its leaders chosen by the obbligati,
who continued to milk and tend to the cows, and produce other goods.$" Such
actions seem, with hindsight, very close to the aspirations of the socialists and
Federterra towards collective ownership of the means of production and of the
land.The strike and its outcome appearedto show a practical way ofachieving
such ends, which remained merely theoretical objectives for the Federterra.
Importantly, the collective organization of the dairies in the Cremonese meant
thatsmallpropertywasvirtuallyimpossible, anddespiteMiglioli'sclaimsto be
promotingthe`landtothepeasants',suchanendamongsthismembershipwas
not a realistic prospect.$# The `Parma pact' which concluded the strike in June
1920 was an advance on that of 1919, and represented a victory for the `white'
leagues and their agitation. Yet, socialist reaction to this important dispute did
not budge from their previous attitudes.
Local `red' unions acted as they had in 1919, proclaiming themselves to be
`neutral'. According to the catholic daily L'Italia this amounted to `socialist
scabbing' and to a `tight link between our red adversaries and the ruling
class'.$$ The tense atmosphere in the `occupied' catholic zones contrasted with
`tranquility' in the `red' zones. Both sets of members kept to their respective
areas and `the one did not invade the sphere of the other'.$% Avanti! praised the
attitude of the local Camera del Lavoro and described the strike as an electoral
manoeuvre by Miglioli. Catholic trade unionism had `run its course' and the
peasants were, the socialist daily wrote, `¯ooding' into the red unions.$&
Federterra agitation, despite its revolutionary phraseology, concentrated on
economic aims ± wages and union rights. These ends, whilst strongly linked to
#) The dispute began on 17 May 1920. See for example the ®ne reports in `Lo sciopero nel
Soresinese degenera in con¯itti sanguinosi', Il Secolo, 14 June 1920. 10,000 peasants were involved
over a wide area, `Nuovi aspetti della lotta nell'attesa dell'accordo', L'Italia, 20 June 1920.
#* Teleg. 5 June 1920 to Min. (ACdS, P.S. 1920,C .1 ,b . 83). The councils were elected in each
cascina with one delegate and two vice-delegates, G. Mussio, `Lo sciopero agricolo nel Soresinese',
L'Italia, 16 June 1920.
$! `Manifesto dell' Unione del Lavoro di Cremona e Provincia' (June), ACdS, P.S. 1920,b . 83.
$" `Crumiraggio socialista: un episidio della lotta tra bianchi e rossi', L'Italia, 4 June 1920.
$# A point made at the time by U. Mondelli, `La terra ai contadini', Il Secolo, 28 June 1920.
$$ `Crumiraggio socialista'. According to the catholics the `reds' had made a non-strike
agreement with the employers. The only example of a Federterra strike (apart from the 24 hour
protest) I have found was a short-lived dispute in April 1919, ACdS, P.S. 1920,b . 83.
$% G. Gioli, `L'estremismo cattolico nel Cremonese' (2 articles) Il Secolo, 18 and 19 June 1920.
$& E. Caporali, `Lo sciopero migliolino nel Soresinese; incidenti e con¯itti', Avanti!, 16 June
1920.the catholic left in italy 423
the braccianti-base, tied in far more with the logic of the employers than the
expropriatory actions of the left catholics ± who proclaimed social peace.$'
Contradictions such as these led to a situation of catholics on the barricades
whilst the socialists continued to work. In Cremona at least, `the extreme left'
was `white', as Miglioli had predicted at Bologna. Only once during the 100-
daydisputedidthetwoorganizationsacttogether.InJune,duringaclashwith
carabinieri a catholic organizer, Paulli, was killed. A twenty-four hour general
strikewasproclaimedtowhichtheCdLadhered,callingforthe`unityofallthe
workers to make the ®ght against bourgeois domination easier'.$( Yet, apart
from those twenty-four hours, as the prefect put it, Miglioli `did not ®nd
agreement [with] the local socialist party'.$) Avanti! justi®ed the strike by
claiming that Paulli was a socialist sympathizer and had voted for the PSI at
the last election. `Red' hostility to Miglioli and the catholic left in general was
unaﬀected by this small display of solidarity.$*
Much the same pattern was repeated in the face of the last great agitation of
the Cremonese catholics in the biennio rosso, which began in October 1920.%!
There were further occupations of cascine by `dairy councils', and attacks by
police on dairies. Nonetheless, as Brezzi writes, the councils, `proceeded to the
autumn sowing and planting of fruit'.%" Socialist-catholic tensions also
intensi®ed. A series of clashes between `red' and `white' sympathizers took
place at public meetings.%# The links of early 1919 were by now a distant
memory, and Miglioli was accused of fostering `illusions' in his followers.%$
During the biennio rosso there was a progressive widening of the basic split
between socialists and catholics in Cremona, and the presence there of the
catholic left did not fundamentally alter local relations with the `red'
organizations.
1921 saw the ®nal and most dramatic occupations. Continual agitation by
the `white' leagues led to the famous Lodo Bianchi (8 June 1921),%% an
agreement which granted almost complete self-management to the dairy
workers and eﬀectively signalled the end of landowner control in the
$' Avanti! called the dairy councils a `parody of soviets'; E. Caporali, `Le mattare dell'on.
Miglioli: la parodia dei soviets', 9 June 1920.
$( The whole manifesto can be found in Caporali, `La sciopero'. `Unity' here of course implied
unity within the CGL. See G. Mussio, `Lo sciopero' and `Mentre si chiude lo sciopero', Il Secolo,
21 June 1920. $) ACds, P.S. 1920,b . 83, 5 May 1920, Pref. to Min.
$* In Avanti! Leonetti described the Miglioli movement as `the most pernicious of the attempts
to suﬀocate the generosity of the popular and peasant will', `Il partito carabiniere dell'anima
pololare', 5 June 1920.
%! This last dispute and the Lodo Bianchi have received much attention from scholars ± see for
example A. Zanibelli, Le leghe bianche nel Cremonese (dal  al Lodo Bianchi) (Rome, 1961). In Oct.
1920 socialists and catholics had concluded separate agreements with the employers. The `white'
strikes lasted 10±18 Oct. 1920, with invasions on 11 Nov. 1920 and from 8 June to 10 Aug. 1921.
%" C. Brezzi, `Il sindacalismo cattolico: l'esperienza della CIL' in Storia del sindacato (Venice,
1982), p. 142.
%# There were clashes on 16 Aug., 19 Sept., 20 Sept., 26 Sept., 10 and 18 Oct. 1920. Only on
one occasion were the instigators the catholics, ACdS, P.S. 1920,b . 83, `Incidenti fra sovversivi e
popolari'. %$ La Difesa, 4 Dec. 1920.
%% F. Bogliari, ed., Il movimento contadino in Italia. Dall'Unita [ al fascismo (Turin, 1980), p. 321.424 john m.foot
Soresinese.%& Sturzo came to Cremona to salute the peasants' victory, keeping
in contact with his rural base, but the Lodo was never applied as the fascists
moved quickly in to restore the old contacts.%'
Left reaction to the catholic victory was universally negative. The local
socialists and communists (the second biggest PCdI federation in Lombardy),
who had remained `neutral' during the strikes, attacked the Lodo. L'Eco dei
Comunisti associated the pact with `sel®sh¼property and the conservation of
bourgeois privilege' whilst recognizing the importance of the dairy councils.%(
La Difesa wrote again of `illusions'.%) Palmiro Togliatti called the pact
`conservative' and `advantageous¼for the ruling classes'.%* In parliament
Nino Mazzoni expressed his hostility to the Lodo as `profoundly conservative'
and spoke of an abyss between `red' and `white' workers.&! `For this reason',
Mazzoni stated, `I remain an enemy of the Lodo Bianchi.' Given this evidence
itisimpossibletoacceptGrieco'slaterassertionthat`thecommunistssupported
and defended him [Miglioli]¼in a ®ght that aﬃrmed for the ®rst time, with
the famous Lodo Bianchi, the capacity and the right of the rural waged-worker
to land, to association of work and to a share in the management of the farm'
(1954).&"
True, Grieco had revised the original communist party position, but only in
1924, calling the Lodo `certainly the most advanced conquest made in Italy by
the agricultural workers'.&# At the time of the Lodo, an atmosphere of
sectarianism against catholics and `reformist' solutions on the left, and against
Miglioliin particular,blinded thePSI andPCdI inconfrontation witha major
rural workers' victory. However, the nature of the catholic base and ideology
of their struggle helped to `provoke' this reaction. The charge of `utopianism'
over the timing of the Lodo may well have been correct. In no sense could the
Cremonese landowners accept for long the limbo situation in which the pact
left them. But the negative response of the whole left to what G. Manacorda
has described as `the unique notable attempt to introduce the social
management of production in a zone of capitalist agriculture' was the last, and
most crucial `red' rejection of base-up alliances with the estremisti in the
dopoguerra.&$
%& The text is now in ibid. pp. 320±3. For the agitation see ACdS, P.S. 1921,b . 66 and
`L'agitazione nel Cremonese e una lettera dell'on. Miglioli', L'Italia, 17 Feb. 1921.
%' Sturzo also called for a `tripling of production' and attacked `class dictatorship' in his speech
to the victorious peasants, `Don Sturzo illustra ai contadini soresinesi il signi®cato della loro
vittoria', Il Secolo, 23 Aug. 1921.
%( Cited in E. Macaluso, `Bianchi e rossi dallo scontro all'alleanza' in Rinascita, 15 Nov. 1974,
pp. 23±4 (an article strongly linked to the `historic compromise' in the PCI).
%) `Illusioni', 4 Dec. 1920; see also E. Caporali, `Popolari, fascisti, socialisti e il Lodo Bianchi',
Avanti!, 4 Dec. 1921.
%* `La supremazia del Partito Popolare', L'Ordine Nuovo, 27 Aug. 1921.
&! Zanibelli ed., Miglioli±Grieco,p .347 (2 Dec. 1921).
&" `Guido Miglioli e l'unita ' contadina', Rinascita, 24 July 1965,p .22.
&# Report to the Krestintern (the `Peasant International'), 21 Nov. 1924, in P. G. Zunino, La
questione Cattolica nella sinistra italiana (±) (Bologna, 1975).
&$ Quoted in Bogliari ed., Il movimento,p .320.the catholic left in italy 425
III
If someone refuses to obey, remove them immediately from their oﬃce
(Letter from the pope to the bishop of Bergamo, published in L'Eco di
Bergamo).&%
We want the land, we want the factories! (Slogan of the Bergamo Unione
del Lavoro, 1920±1).
The catholic Uﬃcio del Lavoro was formed in Bergamo in 1906 speci®cally to
®ght socialism. By 1919 it had over 50,000 members, the vast majority in the
textileindustry,&&andthecitycouldboastthebiggestPPIsectioninItaly(with
more than 10,000 members). A vast network of catholic institutions of all types
stretchedoutacrossthecountrysidearoundBergamoandassistedthisgrowth.&'
In mid-1919 a young trade-unionist, Romano Cocchi, was appointed head of
the UdL. Cocchi's political training had been at Cremona, with Miglioli.&(
UdL recruits were mainly peasant workers, and the union made little initial
impact in `pure' urban-based industries. For most UdL members, who were
often women, `the essential point of reference remained to the peasant world,
of which the worker, outside of the factory, continued to be part, economically
and culturally'.&)
Here, at Bergamo, at the very heart of the catholic world, was where the
estremisti made their greatest national impact. UdL-led strikes in the textile
industry demanded 50 per cent wage increases. This demand was largely
granted, and followed similar agitation in autumn 1919.&* By 1920, the UdL
could claim over 100,000 members and its economic successes were making
inroads into industries outside of normal catholic in¯uence, such as amongst
&% 24 Mar. 1920, quoted in V. Saba, `L'agricoltura, contratti agrari e sindacati cristiani in
Lombardia nel quadriennio, 1919±1922', Bollettino, xi (1976), 119.
&& G. Bonomini puts the ®gures at 30,000 in the Unione del Lavoro (17,720 from textiles, 10,000
peasants, 936 button workers, 693 cement workers, 300 brick workers and 264 metalworkers); `Il
sindacalismo cattolico bergamasco nel primo dopoguerra', Ricerche di Storia Contemporanea
Bergamasca, ii±iii (1972), 33. Other work on the extremists at Bergamo is to be found in later issues
of this journal, and R. Amadei, `Le vicende dell'Uﬃcio del Lavoro, 1919±1921' in A. Bendotti,
ed., Il movimento, pp. 81±92. At the November 1919 election the PPI was the biggest party in the
provincewith nearly55,000votes (64 per cent),taking ®veoutofthe seven seatsonoﬀer(one went
to the PSI with 12,000 votes and one to the Liberal coalition with 18,000). The only candidate of
the left on the PPI list, Cavalli, against whom the right-catholic paper L'Eco di Bergamo
campaigned, gained the highest number of votes, with over 77,000 preferences; ®gures from
G. Laterza, `I primi anni del Partito Popolare a Bergamo', Archivio Storico Bergamasco, v (1983),
303.
&' There were also twelve catholic worker mutual-aid societies, six `rural banks', one workers'
bank, ®ve insurance societies, one building cooperative, one casa del popolo, and seven leagues of
industrial workers in 1913, G. Formigoni, `I cattolici deputati (1904±1919): per la storia di una
classe dirigente in formazione', Bollettino, xx (1985), 110 and see pp. 109±10 for the ®gures for
Brescia, Cremona and Milan.
&( On Cocchi (1893±1944), whose extraordinary life de®nitely merits a biography, see
Bonomini, `Il sindacalismo', passim, and Saba, `L'agricoltura', pp. 114±21. For Cocchi's side of
the story see his pamphlet `Scandali' nella vandea clericale (with Enrico Tulli) (Milan, 1923).
&) M. Mazzucchetti in Bendotti, ed., Il movimento,p .100.
&* In April the CdL won the eight-hour day, by early August the catholics matched this success
for their members and had secured a 20 per cent pay deal. Local socialists had negotiated more
favourable agreements after an earlier 12-day strike; Bonomini, `Il sindicalismo', p. 31.426 john m.foot
the cement workers.'! Left catholicism was rapidly gaining strength inside the
PPIandmanagedtowincontrolofthelocalprovisionalcommitteewithtwelve
out of ®fteen seats in May.'" Catholic factory owners around Bergamo viewed
the UdL with dismay, and carried out a long campaign in L'Eco di Bergamo to
discredit Cocchi and his supporters.
The national impact of these developments was only felt towards the end of
March 1920, when news came through of a meeting of a so-called `gruppo di
avanguardia' at Bergamo. A group of left-wing catholics in the PPI had met for
two days (19±20 March 1920) to discuss tactics and policies for future estremisti
action. Miglioli, Speranzini and Cocchi attended, as did militants from all
parts of the country. The Avanguardia conference was widely reported in the
national press, and wasswiftly condemned by Sturzo,liberal and most catholic
newspapers, and many PPI deputies.'#
From that point on a split in the party at Bergamo was inevitable, and the
pope,inalettertothelocalbishop ± publishedinL'EcodiBergamo ± intervened
strongly against the left. The leader of the catholic church described the use of
socialistlanguagebycatholicorganizersas`anactioncompletelyperversefrom
the christian spirit'.'$ At the second congress of the PPI the defeat of the left
madeaswiftclamp-downontheestremistipossible.'%InJuneCocchiwassacked
from his position as UdL secretary by the local bishop, and a violent split
racked local catholic organizations. The two sides clashed in church, in
factories and on the streets. Families were torn apart. Cocchi supporters
occupied the catholic casa del popolo and on 22 August a new federation was
formed by the rebels, the Unione del Lavoro (UndL), with a newspaper, Bandiera
Bianca [white ¯ag].'& The new UndL took the majority of the workers from the
old organization, as many as 60,000 according to later research.'' For the ®rst
time a catholic union had been formed which explicitly rejected confessional
churchauthority ± anditwasoperatingintheverycentreof`white'power,the
area with the biggest PPI section in the whole of Italy. What did these events,
namely the unfolding of deep ®ssures in the catholic movement, and a class
'! G. Gioli, `Tra i cattolici rossi nelle Bergamasche', Il Secolo, 7 Feb. 1920.
'" `Piena vittoria degli estremisti al convegno dei popolari a Bergamo', Il Secolo, 31 May 1920.
'# L'Italia was very critical, see for example `Popolari estremisti', 21 Mar. 1920 (with the attack
by Sturzo), and Gli `avanguardisti', 25 Mar. 1920. For the national press note `Dopo il convegno
avanguardista di Bergamo: attacchi cattolici all'on. Miglioli' and `I bolscevichi di Gesu ' ', Corriere
della Sera both 21 Mar. 1920. Later in 1920, Gruppi di Avanguardia met at Milan to criticise the
political activity of the PPI leadership; Motta, `Sindacalismo cristiano', p. 354.
'$ `Al venerabile fratello L. Maria Vescovo di Bergamo', L'Eco di Bergamo, 24 Mar. 1920.
'% On the defeat at Napoli see `Gli estremisti battuti nel voto sulla questione agraria', Corriere
della Sera, 11 Apr. 1920. Strangely enough Sturzo had earlier defended the `white' unions against
accusations of `Bolshevism' by L'Eco di Bergamo, `Il PPI ed il movimento economico: una circolare
di Don Sturzo', L'Italia, 24 Feb. 1920.
'& FordivisionswithinfamiliesseeACdS,P.S.1920,b.144,K.2,`PPI',andforthecatholicpress
note `I ``fatti'' di Bergamo: come gli estremisti non hanno vinto', 6 June 1920, `I ``fatti'' di
Bergamo', 9 and 10 June 1920, `Dopo i fatti di Bergamo', 13 June 1920, `L'insegnamento dei fatti
di Bergamo', 16 June 1920, all L'Italia.
'' G. Bonomini, `Il sindacalismo', p. 52. In ACdS, P.S. 1920,b . 144 the claim was that two-
thirds of the textile and cement workers in the old UdL left with Cocchi's new organization.the catholic left in italy 427
struggle within the `white' world, mean for socialist±catholic relations in
Bergamo? Above all did the presence of the Cocchian left make alliances more,
or less likely?
In 1919, agitation over the eight-hour day and textile strikes had seen
separate action by socialists and catholics. However, in early 1920 there were
instances of unity. In February L'Italia reported that after a catholic meeting
of textile workers, `many workers from the lignite quarries of Val Gandino
united themselves to the striking masses, and to the usual agitators that attend
similar events'. A violent demonstration followed in front of an industrialist's
house.'(
But, in the wake of the `fatti di Bergamo' of June 1920, the PSI maintained
its negative attitude towards the catholic left. As at Cremona, Leonetti argued
that the events at Bergamo showed how catholic workers were a danger to the
revolution ± a `true obstacle' ± because of their links to the church and hence
to domination and authority. Leonetti believed that this `danger' was greater
where the catholics were more left wing. Given this line, which was never
countered in Avanti!, the socialists would have had to ®ght the left±catholics
with greater force than those on the right.') Only Gramsci took a more positive view
of the Bergamo organizations. Replying to a letter attacking a previous article,
Gramsci asked whether socialists should be against soviets because at Bergamo
any soviets would be controlled by catholics? He added another rhetorical
question, `do we need to remove from Italian soil the race of workers and
peasantsthatfollowpoliticallythe¯agoftheleft-wingofthePopularParty?'.'*
There was a need to ®nd `a system of equilibrium'. Apart from Gramsci, only
the anarchists displayed a certain sympathy for the `white bolsheviks' at
Bergamo.(!
Bergamo was not free from the socialist±catholic violence that has been
examinedelsewhere.Suchclashesoccurredevenduringthemomentsofhighest
tension within the catholic movement, although on a smaller scale than in
other areas.(" At least ten incidents were recorded between June and October
1920. The only edition of Bandiera Bianca that appeared in 1920 contained
strong attacks on the PPI, a call for worker±peasant alliance and anti-socialist
propaganda. In response to the accusation of being pro-socialist, Bandiera
Bianca replied that `we are continuing to ®ght happily precisely against the
'( `L'accordo nello sciopero dei tessili bergamaschi: intorno agli incidenti di Gandino', 7 Feb.
1920.
') A. Leonetti, `L'autonomia politica del PP; dopo lo scandalo di Bergamo', Avanti!, 24 June
1920 and `Gli eretici di Bergamo', ibid. 10 June 1920. A better analysis was `La crisi dei popolari
a Bergamo', ibid. 10 June 1920.
'* `Cronache dell'Ordine Nuovo', L'Ordine Nuovo, 2, 41, 20 Mar. 1920.
(! `Note Bergamasche: le ribellioni popolari e le conseguenti scomuniche', Umanita [ Nova, 13
June 1920.
(" ACdS, P.S. 1920,b . 78, `Violenze di socialisti contro popolari'. According to the prefect of
Bergamo `in this province¼there have not been systematic attacks by the reds against the popolari
organisations and associations' (Pref. ± Min., 3 July 1920). The archive still reported two
confrontations in June, two in July and October and three in November 1920. See also `Incruenta
mischia nel Bergamasco fra cattolici e socialisti', Il Secolo, 3 May 1920.428 john m.foot
socialists¼wecontinuetoconfrontthesocialistswith ourchristiantrade union
programme and our action'.(# Cocchi himself advocated violence in defence of
catholic workers victimized by `red' unions in Lombardy in early 1920.($
However, these `anti-socialist' articles were usually defensive replies to
accusations from within the catholic world. The estremisti were not naturally
anti-socialist and certainly did not prioritize what they criticized as `a sterile
anti-socialism'. The participation of `Cocchian' workers in occupations of
textile factories in October 1920, using the same methods as the `red' unions,
was evidence of this.(% Yet, the need of the UndL to ®ght on three fronts,
againstitsrivalcatholicfederation,theemployersandthesocialists,withoutthe
support of church institutions, seriously limited its space for action. Real
alliances with the socialists would only come later, and in a defensive sense,
with fascism on the rise.(& Nonetheless, Cocchi's short-lived attempt to form a
`lay catholic' workers' organization still represented a decisive moment for the
`whites' in the biennio rosso. Without church support, and unable to form
alliances either to the left or to the centre, the estremisti could not survive. At
BergamotheselessonswerequicklytakenonboardbyCocchiandhisfollowers.
IV
Idonotunderstandwhythesocialistsareagainstthewhiteorganisations,
while they should be making common cause in the interest of the
proletariat they¼should unite all the proletarian forces.
(Miglioli to parliament, 4 February 1921)('
With the increasing violence of the fascist squads in 1920 and 1921, the period
of oﬀensive action by both socialists and catholics came rapidly to an end. The
(# Il nostro programma giudicata dalla stampa', Bandiera Bianca [hereafter BB], 1, 1, 11 July
1920. For the attacks on the PPI see `Come parla Cocchi a Napoli', ibid. 11 July 1920, and for the
worker±peasant alliance `In cammino', ibid. On Cocchi's anti-socialism see `Una politica positiva
contro il socialismo', L'Eco di Bergamo, 19 June 1920, and Cocchi's letter to Esposto, `Dopo i fatti
di Bergamo: Una parola agli operai ed operaie', L'Italia, 13 June 1920, where Cocchi assured his
followers that he intended to `continue to confront anti-christian socialism from amongst the
masses'.
($ In a telegram expressing solidarity with victimized catholic workers Cocchi wrote `we will
react [by] returning violence with all our force, all our faith', printed in L'Italia, 3 Feb. 1920, cited
in Motta, `Sindacalismo cristiano', p. 351.
(% On these occupations compare Cocchi's account, which claimed the involvement of twenty
factories and 25,000 workers, but only for one day, Scandali, pp. 65±6, with that of L'Italia,` L a
vertenza dei tessili bergamaschi', 9 Oct. 1920.
(& The other key areas of the estremisti strength in 1919±20 were Brescia, the Veneto and Trento.
OnalliancesintheVeronesesee`L'agitazioneagrarianelVeneto:unagrandebattagliadi500,000
lavoratori bianchi', L'Italia, 13 June 1920, and A. Canavero, `Il movimento sindacale bianco: I
risultati di un incontro di studio', Bolletino, xvi (1981), 298±305. The agrarian pact of May 1920
in Vicentino was recognized by `reds' and catholics alike. `Red'±`white' strikes also took place at
Padua, L'Italia, 17 May 1920. For socialist hostility to the Verona action see `Veneto: la lotta dei
contadini', Battaglie Sindacali, 19 June 1920. According to Il Secolo, `I clericali prima e dopo la
guerra', 3 Dec. 1920, there was a `deadly hatred' between catholics and socialists at Verona but
Zalin gives examples of joint agreements and union pluralism in the Veronese countryside, `Lotte
contadine', pp. 599±628. (' `La discussione alla Camera', L'Italia, 4 Feb. 1921.the catholic left in italy 429
destruction of both `white' and `red' cooperatives and union headquarters,
and attacks on members, imposed the necessity of defensive union struggle. It
was only in the two leading regions of left catholicism that this situation
produced alliances between socialists and catholics. At a national level the
ambivalent attitude of the PPI, in often supporting fascist action and joining
the anti-socialist blocs in the 1920±1 local elections, contrasted with the vicious
struggles at Cremona and Bergamo. Miglioli's house was burnt down twice by
the fascists and he was personally attacked, as was Cocchi. Yet, at Milan, the
attitude of the PPI and catholic establishment strongly supported the fascist
occupation of local government oﬃces and the end of local democracy after
1922.(( Once again the rural estremisti had shown themselves to be far more
radical than the conservative urban catholics at Milan.
At Bergamo, the aforementioned split in the `white' unions facilitated an
alliance between the new UndL and the CGL. This agreement, the ®rst of its
kind in Italian history, was signed in August 1921. The rise of fascism had
necessitated a `proletarian block and a united trade union front'.() Bandiera
Bianca wrote that catholic workers were now `part of the great proletarian
Italian family'.(* The pact allowed religious freedom, and proclaimed
economic defence of its members.)! L'Italia saw the alliance as proof, if any was
needed, of the real intentions of Cocchi all along. His `red methods' had ®nally
led him to ally with the `enemy' ± socialism.)"
A similar pact was agreed at Cremona in March 1922, where a formal
alliance had seemed likely after a long period of informal ties and attacks on
both organizations by the fascist squads led by Farinacci.)# Cremona's alliance
sanctioned common defence against fascism, and called for such a pact at a
national level, between unions and political parties.)$ However, both the PPI
and PSI leaderships attacked the agreement. Sturzo repudiated the idea of
local pacts, whilst the socialists also criticized the whole concept of such an
alliance.)%TheCgdl,however,calledthepactanexampleof`classunity'.Both
local organizations bravely replied to these criticisms and re-emphasized the
need for national change. Yet, no such moves were made and the pact at
Cremona remained a series of minor and localistic episodes, such as a uni®ed
(( Vecchio, I cattulici milanesi, pp. 252±61.
() Quello che insegna la reazione', Bandiera Bianca, 30 May 1921. The rapid reduction of the
UndL's membership to 11,000 emphasized its reliance on church institutions for support.
(* `Il fronte unico realizzato', Bandiera Bianca, 1 Sept. 1921 and `Monito e promessa', 11 Sept.
1921. See also Mazzucchetti, `L'estremismo', p. 103 and Cocchi, Scandal,p .75.
)! ACdS, P.S. 1921,b . 115, Pref.-Min. 946}2, 28 Aug. 1921.
)" `L'ultimo fasto del Cocchi', 12 July 1921.
)# The vice-president of the socialists at Cremona, Boldori, was killed by the fascists (12 Dec.
1921) and the PPI and PSI voted together for the ®rst time at the local council in January 1922
on a motion attacking fascism, Duchi, `Socialisti e migliolini', p. 88. A similar pact was agreed at
Verona in 1921, Zalin, `Lotte contadine'.
)$ The text is in `Il patto di Cremona', Battaglie Sindacali, 16 Mar. 1922.
)% Duchi, `Socialisti e migliolini', p. 89. Claudio Treves gave limited and ambiguous support to
the pact, `Socialisti e popolari: il patto di Cremona e un incidente parlamentare', Critica Sociale,
16±31Mar.1922.BattaglieSindacaliwasmorepositiveabouttheagreement,pinpointingtheenemy
as fascism, not the PPI, `Unita ' di classe', 16 Mar. 1922.430 john m.foot
celebrationforthe®rstofMay,ratherthanthesparktowardsmorewidespread
alliances.)& Nonetheless, it was signi®cant that the two most important
moments of anti-fascist `white'±`red' alliances took place in the areas of
greatest left±catholic support. Where `positive' coalitions had been impossible,
alliances were formed in defence of democratic institutions.
In many other regions, the story continued to be one of separation and
mutual mistrust. Despite a more open attitude in the Cgdl leadership to
pluralistrecognition,)'incidentsofsocialist±catholicviolencecontinued.Many
of these clashes stemmed from a hardened anti-socialism on behalf of the PPI,
but violent anticlericalism remained an integral part of maximalist propa-
ganda.)(Yet,thenumberandseriousnessoftheseincidentswasonafarsmaller
scale than in 1919±20, re¯ecting the slowing down of rural and urban class
struggle. The expulsion of both Speranzini and Cocchi from the PPI in early
1921 signalled the internal defeat of the estremisti and the isolation of Miglioli
within the party.)) Many popolari now agreed that the very function of the
catholic party was to defeat socialism. A pamphlet published in 1922 Socialismo
e il Partito Popolare)* argued that the PPI had to oppose `co-operative to co-
operative, league to league, union to union, idea to idea'.*! The programme of
the anti-bolshevik leagues of 1919 was repeated word-for-word. L'Italia
describedsocialismas`anadversarywhichhastobefoughtwithout quarter'.*"
Alongside the survival of these old attitudes another process was taking
place. Under the pressure of fascist repression and the local alliances at
Bergamo and Cremona, some socialists and catholics began to reconsider their
former enemies and re-analyse their position in society. These developments
could not prevent the victory of fascism, but laid a theoretical basis for the
future defeat of Mussolini in the resistance. The 1920s and 1930s saw a whole
seriesoftheoreticalstudiesonalliancesbetween`red'and`white'fromallsides
of the Italian anti-fascist movement.
Where does the responsibility lie for this sad story of sectarianism and
recrimination? It is hard to attach too much blame to the catholic left. They
were battling against tremendous odds ± the church, the authorities, the
landowners and the socialists. Nevertheless the estremisti managed to build
important organizations and win innovative economic and social gains for
their members. The socialists, locally and nationally, were bitterly opposed to
the left±catholics. Nearly all `reds' simply refused to accept that a real
)& `Popolari e socialisti', L'Ordine Nuovo, 20 Mar. 1922; Bello, Le avanguardie,p .139.
)' For example `L'on. D'Aragona e la collaborazione', L'Italia, 21 Sept. 1921.
)( For examples of the latter see `Vimercate', `I 10 numeri e i 100 errori del PPI', La Battaglia
Socialista, 7 May 1921.
)) Bandiera Bianca, 13 Feb. 1920. All UndL members were expelled in Bergamo, not just Cocchi.
)* P. Maraglia(Pistoia,1922).Catholic±socialistviolenceafter1920isdetailedinASMi,b.1015
(30 Mar. 1921 at Milan) and ACdS, P.S. 1921,b . 69, at Rome, Magenta, and in the province of
Milan, and on 21 Mar. 1921 at Abbiategrasso. Socialist local administrations at Novara and
Pioltello decided to take down cruci®xes in local schools in 1921, provoking a ferocious response
from the local catholics, ACdS, P.S. 1921,C . 2 ,b . 79 and P.S. 1921,b .115,K . 2on local
government. *! Maraglia, Socialismo,p .128.
*" `Volterrianesimo Rosso', 7 Jan. 1921.the catholic left in italy 431
movement existed in Cremona or Bergamo. For the socialists Miglioli was a
`bluﬀ', a `trick', a `servant of the employers'. All these accusations were so
clearly untrue that it is diﬃcult today to explain fully why they were made.
This article has tried to draw out some of the main reasons, namely the twin
traditions of anticlericalism and anti-socialism and above all the atmosphere
created by the violence of the war, Russia and the biennio rosso.
It is often claimed that Gramsci and certain of his colleagues were diﬀerent,
that they were more open to alliances and analyses of the catholic estremisti in
general. As a conclusion to this article I will assess how true these claims are.
Certainly, only L'Ordine Nuovo attempted a real study of the PPI and its left
wing. Initially, in June 1919, Gramsci adopted the same critique of Miglioli as
that used by the maximalists ± accusing the Cremonese deputy of opportunism
and praising the reformist Federterra above the catholic organizations.*# The
catholic left were `pseudo-revolutionaries', typical of the movement that
blossomed in periods of change.*$ Towards the end of 1919 Gramsci began to
see the PPI in a diﬀerent light ± as a potentially useful organizer of the
`backward' masses that the PSI and Federterra could not draw into its ranks.*%
Catholic unions began to be placed more positively within the revolutionary
process. During February 1920 this `role' attributed to the `white' leagues was
further de®ned. The war had created a party `of the peasants', the PPI, which
appealedtoruralclassesandhadthemeans(inparticular®nancialinstitutions)
to draw into its ranks many poor peasants and small proprietors. Gramsci
underlined the mass nature of the PPI (he wrote that the party had `700,000
members!', in `Il popolari' only three months earlier, Gramsci had scoﬀed at
how small PPI membership was!) and the eventual split that would take place
within the party.*& The PPI was a party of `two branches' which, with class
struggle,wouldsplitapart.*'Left-catholicswerebynowseenas`revolutionary'
(the `pseudo' had disappeared) and as helping the peasants to mount
insurrectionary activity.*( Yet, this period of re¯ection only lasted through
February. With the Piedmontese general strike and the factory council
movement the ordinovisti simply stopped examining the forces behind the PPI.
Between February and September, L'Ordine Nuovo published one anti-religious
article dedicated to `the thinkers of the PP'.*) It was only with the defeat of the
factory occupations in September that the theme returned. L'Ordine Nuovo
arguedthatthePPIhadorganizedthe`historicallylazy'peasantryanditsbase
had been taken over by the `estremisti'. Class struggle had exposed the
contradictions of catholic interclassism.**
Gramsci's re¯ections on the PPI and its left in 1919±20 were important for
*# `Voci della Terra', L'Ordine Nuovo, 21 June 1919.
*$ L'Ordine Nuovo, 13 Sept. 1919, and see above all `I Popolari', ibid. 1 Nov. 1919.
*% Ibid. 28±9 Nov. 1919.
*& Theevents at Bergamo and Cremona to some extent supported these predictions, ibid. 7 Feb.
1920 and ibid., 11 and 18 Feb. 1920. *' Avanti! (Piedmont), 20 Feb. 1920.
*( L'Ordine Nuovo, 26 Mar. 1920.
*) The piece was a reprint from Croce, `La vanita ' della religione', ibid. 17 July 1920.
** Ibid. 4 Sept. 1920.432 john m.foot
two reasons. First, they opened the way to a real analysis of the classes
organizedby the catholicsand to a positive evaluation of the role of the `white'
organizations in the countryside. Gramsci's analysis later formed the basis of
the famous intervention by Terracini at the Livorno congress (1921) and of the
reassessment of the catholic movement by Grieco, Di Vittorio and Gramsci
under fascism. Secondly, the idea of splitting the PPI tied in with some of the
views of the catholic left itself and pre®gured later approaches to Miglioli and
Cocchi in 1923±6, which were important attempts at socialist±catholic alliance
building.However,theordinovisti'scharacterizationofthePPIwasalsomarked
with severe problems.
Forastart,thePPIwasnotapartyofthepeasantryasawhole,butofcertain
types of peasants and urban-based middle classes. The ®ght within the PPI
could not just be reduced to a class struggle in the countryside. Secondly, the
assumption of `backwardness' in the PPI membership was paternalistic and
opportunistic. In fact, at Cremona, catholic strength was amongst some of the
most capitalistic agricultural enterprises in Italy. Far from being `less'
revolutionary than the socialists ± as in Gramsci's analogy of Kerensky
comparedtoLenin ± manyofthestrugglesinspiredbythecatholicleftwerefar
more radical than those of the Federterra. In Lombardy (outside of Pavia) this
was certainly the case. Thirdly, the ordinovisti were not united on the catholic
question. The presence of Seassaro"!! and Leonetti, whose views on the PPI
were negative in the extreme,"!" in the same group was testimony to this.
Finally,theideaofthePPI`organizingtheunorganized'leftoutonegreatarea
± theSouth.Suchatheorymaywellhave®ttedcertainareasoftheNorth ± the
Veneto, and parts of Lombardy ± but the PPI's electoral and material failure
to make any impression on liberal and social-democratic hegemony in the
south was vital."!# It showed that the catholics did not appeal to all `small
peasants' as such, but only certain small peasants in certain areas. These areas
were, in the main, those where the church was already the dominant cultural
and social organization, and catholic unions could exploit these structures as a
spring-board. Elsewhere, as with the day-labourers of the Po Valley, `red'
culture (with its own `religious' elements) was dominant. The historically
speci®c nature of the southern question precluded any general analyses of the
PPIasa`peasantparty'atthattime.Inaddition,genderanditsrelationtothe
catholic movement formed no part of the analysis of the catholic party.
"!! Cesare Seassaro was a socialist±catholic and ex-combatant. He wrote that anticlericalism
was part of bourgeois ideology and that many priests could be seen as workers (`La legislazione
comunista: come applicare in Italia la costituzione russa'; ibid. 14 Feb. 1920), and attacked `the
parliamentary anticlericalism' (ibid. 31 July 1920) of the reformists as `dogma', arguing for
private religious freedom. The `eccentric' nature of Seassaro's views and his early death in 1921
prevented any real dissemination of such opinions in the Communist Party.
"!" `Il partito carabiniere'.
"!# The PPI did best in Sicily and the province of Rome, worst in Basilicata (no seats in Nov.
1919), Abruzzo (none), Sardinia (one) and Apulia (none). Although the Cosentino area in
Calabria has been described as an `oasis' of Catholic activity; J. Steinberg, `The poor in Christ:
peasants, priests and politics in the Cosenza general strike' in History, society and the churches: essays
in honour of Owen Chadwick, eds., G. Best and D. Beales (Cambridge, 1985), p. 268.the catholic left in italy 433
Hence, even Gramsci's work on the catholics in 1919±20 was schematic and
incomplete. Real linkage with the left catholics was to come only with the rise
of fascism and the `new' PCdI line after 1924. A real opportunity had been
missedbythe socialists in the bienniorosso.Estremisti organizershad taken onthe
`white' bourgeoisie deep in their Lombard heartlands, and had brie¯y seemed
to be winning. They received no support, only neutrality and opposition from
the `reds' ± socialists, anarchists and syndicalists alike. The extraordinary rise
and fall of the innovative estremisti in 1919±20 was a rich moment in catholic
history. Socialists, even those around Gramsci, could only look back on their
reactions with regret. In the years after 1920 a reassessment began which was
tohaveprofoundtheoreticalimplicationsforalliancetheory.Bythen,however,
fascism was on the rampage.